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1Abstract: We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort
on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive
mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the
agent. Formally, the model is a Stackelberg di®erential game in which the players use feedback
strategies. Whereas in general Stackelberg di®erential games with feedback strategy spaces the
leader's optimization problem has non-standard features that make it extremely hard to solve,
in the present case this problem can be rewritten as a standard optimal control problem. Two
examples are used to illustrate our approach.
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21 Introduction
Di®erential games in which the players use feedback strategies are hard to solve for Stackelberg
equilibria. Basar and Olsder (1982) already noted that \such decision problems cannot be
solved by utilizing standard techniques of optimal control theory [...] because the reaction set
of the follower cannot, in general, be determined in closed form, for all possible strategies of the
leader, and hence the optimization problem faced by the leader on this reaction set becomes
quite an implausible one" (page 315). For stochastic games, the di±culties are even more severe
so that Basar and Olsder (1982) concluded that the \derivation of the Stackelberg solution in
stochastic dynamic games meets with unsurmountable di±culties" (page 336) and \remains,
today, as a challenge for the researchers" (page 337).1
More than 25 years have passed since the publication of the classical text by Basar and Olsder
(1982) but, still, the literature on feedback Stackelberg equilibria in di®erential games is very
sparse. The authors of one of the more recent textbooks on the subject, Dockner et al. (2000),
still admit that \the analysis of such an equilibrium in a di®erential game may lead to consid-
erable technical di±culties" (page 134). In order to circumvent these di±culties, they suggest
to restrict the class of strategies of the leader to a ¯nite-dimensional space. Under such a
restriction, the leader solves a ¯nite-dimensional (static) optimization problem instead of the
dynamic and, hence, in¯nite-dimensional problem that Basar and Olsder (1982) have referred
to as \quite implausible". This approach, which has been used for example by Benchekroun
and Long (1998, 2002), is not unproblematic as it may lead to a solution that di®ers substan-
1Unfortunately, the literature does not use a common terminology. Basar and Olsder (1982), in particular,
distinguish between the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium and the global Stackelberg equilibrium. It is the
latter that we have in mind when we speak about Stackelberg equilibria.
3tially from the true feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, or it may produce a solution in cases
where a true feedback Stackelberg equilibrium does not even exist. In general, non-existence
of feedback Stackelberg equilibria cannot be ruled out even in simple problems satisfying stan-
dard smoothness and curvature properties. All these issues have recently been illustrated by
Shimomura and Xie (2008) in the context of common-property resource games. Nevertheless,
in some cases it is possible to rewrite the leader's optimization problem in such a way that it
becomes amenable to standard optimal control techniques. The main purpose of the present
paper is to introduce one class of models in which such a transformation works, and to illustrate
the solution method by means of two examples.
The models considered in the present paper can most easily be interpreted as dynamic principal-
agent situations. The standard textbook principal-agent problem is set in a static framework;
see, e.g., chapter 14 in Mas-Collel et al. (1995). The principal o®ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract
to the agent. The contract is designed so as to induce the agent to perform a task according to
the preferences of the principal. In return for his performance, the agent receives a contractual
payment from the principal which is conditional on some observable and veri¯able outcome of his
activities. The payment scheme must be su±ciently attractive to ensure that the agent accepts
the contract instead of taking an outside option. In the present paper we assume that the task
to be performed by the agent is to contribute to the control of an endogenous state variable
over an in¯nite time-horizon. This adds a crucial dynamic feature to the standard (static)
principal-agent model: in designing the optimal contract, the principal must take into account
the endogenously evolving state of the system. In other words, the principal has to decide on
how to feed the state variable back into the agent's optimal control problem throughout the
in¯nite time horizon. It is exactly this feature that makes the dynamic optimization problem
of the principal a non-standard one, as described in the above quotes from Basar and Olsder
4(1982).
We start with a rather general setup for our analysis. We assume that both players (the principal
and the agent) can a®ect the dynamics of the state variable. More speci¯cally, the evolution of
the state is described by a linear stochastic di®erential equation the stochastic component of
which is a standard Wiener process (Brownian motion). The two utility functions by which the
principal and the agent, respectively, evaluate the state of the system can be arbitrary (smooth)
functions. The costs of applying e®ort to control the state are also assumed be general (smooth
and strictly convex) functions of the respective e®ort levels. Finally, the two players may have
di®erent time-preference rates. There is, however, one important structural assumption that
we have to impose on the model in order to obtain analytical tractability: we assume that
the contractual payment of the principal to the agent takes the form of a direct transfer of
utility. This assumption together with the participation constraint will be shown to render the
optimization problem of the principal (leader) tractable in several important cases.
In order to cast this dynamic principal-agent model into a di®erential game framework with
feedback strategies, we assume that the current value of the state variable can be observed by
both players and by the courts, but that it cannot be memorized. As for the agent's e®ort, we
follow the principal-agent literature by assuming that it cannot be observed or veri¯ed. Thus,
contracts can only be made contingent on the current value of the state variable as well as
on the commonly known structure of the model. In technical terms, the principal's contract
must be formulated in terms of feedback strategies. The hierarchical decision making process
according to which the principal announces the contract before the agent decides on whether
to accept it or not (and, if he does accept, on how much e®ort to expend) is then appropriately
re°ected by the Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
5There have been several attempts to formulate dynamic principal-agent problems. The ¯rst
paper is that of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). They assume (p. 308) that (i) the agent
evaluates wealth at a single point in time (the terminal time) after all the actions have been
taken, (ii) the cost of actions can be expressed in monetary units, (iii) the utility functions of the
principal and the agent are both exponential, and (iv) neither party has any private information
at the time of signing the contract. The agent's strategy at any time can be dependent on the
whole history of observations up to that time. The payment the principal makes to the agent
takes place only in the last period, and is dependent on the whole history of observations. The
costs are incurred in each period, but they are summed up (without discounting) in the last
period, and this sum is valued only in the last period. Under these assumptions, they show that
the optimal compensation rule is linear in pro¯t. Their linearity result has been generalized
by Schattler and Sung (1993) and Sung (1995). Clearly, the formulation chosen by Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) requires a high degree of commitment and memory that we do not allow
in our formulation.
A recent paper by Sannikov (2008) studies a problem similar to ours. In his formulation, the
principal does not exercise e®ort and has a utility function that is linear in pro¯t. The agent
gets paid continuously and his utility is strictly concave in the payment. Both utility functions
do not contain the state variable as an argument. Our model is more general in several respects:
we allow the utility functions to depend on the state variable, we allow the principal to exercise
e®ort, and we allow the rate of discount of the principal to be di®erent from that of the agent.
Another type of dynamic extension of the principal-agent problem is concerned with the ratchet-
e®ect problem: if in period 1 an agent reveals his type, the principal may become fully informed
in period 2 and thus, in the absence of pre-commitment, she will be able to press the agent to
6his reservation utility level in period 2. Knowing this, the agent may not want to reveal his
type in period 1. This type of problem has been studied for example by La®ont and Tirole
(1988). One dynamic extension that avoids the ratchet e®ect problem involves the situation
where the agent's characteristics change every period in a random and independent way as in
the papers by Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1995, 1996, 1998). In Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long
(1995), for example, the dynamic element consists of changes in the value of an exhaustible
resource stock. The principal is the government that owns the resource stock and wants to
extract royalty payments from the resource-extracting ¯rms, whose cost characteristics are
private information. Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1995) solve for a time-dependent Stackelberg
equilibrium and derive the optimal resource royalty scheme for each period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3
considers the agent's optimization problem. Given the principal's contract, this is a standard
optimal control problem that can be solved by the maximum principle or by dynamic program-
ming. A crucial step in our analysis is to represent the optimality conditions in the form of
an implementability condition for the principal. In doing this we follow the approach taken by
Chang (1988) or, more recently, by Shimomura and Xie (2008). The implementability condi-
tion then becomes a constraint for the principal's optimization problem, which we discuss in
section 4. The main result of that section is the reformulation of this non-standard optimiza-
tion problem. There are two cases in which the reformulation yields indeed a standard optimal
control problem: the case of equal time-preference rates and the deterministic case. Section 5
discusses the issues of time-consistency and Markov-perfection of the equilibrium. The equilib-
ria that we discuss typically do not have these properties and we explain that requiring them
to hold would be a very strong restriction. In sections 6 and 7 we discuss examples of our
general model in which we can easily solve for feedback Stackelberg equilibria. Section 6 deals
7with a linear model in which both players choose to apply constant e®ort in equilibrium, and
section 7 considers a linear-quadratic setup in which the equilibrium e®ort strategies turn out
to be linear functions of the state. Finally, section 8 presents concluding remarks and describes
directions for future research.
2 Model formulation
Time is measured continuously and extends from 0 to +1. The state of the system at time
t is denoted by x(t) 2 R. The state can be interpreted as a stock that potentially a®ects the
well-being of two players, which we call the principal and the agent, respectively. The initial
stock x(0) = x0 2 R is a given parameter. The state variable evolves according to the stochastic
di®erential equation
dx(t) = [®uP(t) + uA(t) ¡ ±x(t)] dt + ¾(x(t))dw(t); x(0) = x0; (1)
where ® and ± are non-negative constants, and where uP(t) 2 R and uA(t) 2 R are control
variables of the principal and the agent, respectively. While the agent can always in°uence the
evolution of the state variable, this is the case for the principal if and only if ® > 0. The case
® = 0, on the other hand, re°ects a situation in which the principal herself has no control over
the state of the system. Finally, the process w is a standard Wiener process (Brownian motion)
and ¾ : R 7! [0;+1) is a continuously di®erentiable function.
Applying e®ort to control the state causes °ow costs CP(uP(t)) and CA(uA(t)) to the principal
and the agent, respectively. It is assumed that both CP : R 7! R and CA : R 7! R are twice
continuously di®erentiable, strictly convex, and satisfy CP(0) = CA(0) = C0
P(0) = C0
A(0) = 0.
The principal has the additional possibility of transferring utility to the agent, possibly with
8a distortion. More speci¯cally, we assume that the principal has a second control variable
v(t) with the interpretation that ¯v(t) units of the principal's utility must be sacri¯ced in
order to increase the agent's utility °ow by v(t) units. The parameter ¯ can be any strictly
positive number. Finally, it is assumed that the principal derives utility FP(x(t)) from the
stock, whereas the agent's utility from the stock is FA(x(t)). The utility functions FP : R 7! R
and FA : R 7! R are assumed to be continuously di®erentiable. The two players maximize
their expected life-time utility and have time-preference rates ½P and ½A, respectively, both
assumed to be strictly positive. Taking all of these assumptions into account, we can write the











¡½At [FA(x(t)) ¡ CA(uA(t)) + v(t)] dt; (3)
respectively, where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time 0.
All parameters of the model (including the initial state x0) as well as the functions CP, CA,
FP, FA, and ¾ are assumed to be common knowledge. The state variable x(t) is observable by
both players and by the courts. However, neither the players nor the courts can keep a memory
of the state (except for its initial value x0). Enforceable contracts between the two parties can
therefore only be based on the commonly known structure of the model and on the current
value of the state variable.
At time 0 the principal proposes a contract (UP;V ), where UP : R 7! R and V : R 7! R map
the state space into the respective control spaces. The interpretation of such a contract is that
the principal promises to spend own e®ort according to uP(t) = UP(x(t)) and to transfer utility
9according to v(t) = V (x(t)) provided that the agent satis¯es his contractual duties.2 The agent
is assumed to have an outside option that yields utility ¹ JA. Without loss of generality we set
¹ JA = 0. Also at time 0, but after the principal's announcement of the contract, the agent
has to decide whether to accept the principal's contract or not. If he accepts the contract, he
foregoes his access to the outside option and chooses a function UA : R 7! R which determines
his contribution according to uA(t) = UA(x(t)). We assume that contracts can be fully enforced
by the courts. This requires that the courts can observe the principal's e®ort uP(t), her transfer
v(t), and the agent's compliance with the requirement not to use the outside option. In other
words, once the agent has agreed to the principal's contract, the principal is committed to her
strategies (UP;V ) and the agent has no access to his outside option. Note that both the contract
(UP;V ) and the agent's strategy UA may depend on the initial state x0. We are interested in
a hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium. This means that the agent chooses his strategy UA as
a best response to the principal's strategies (UP;V ), and that the principal takes this best
response fully into account when she optimally selects her own strategies (UP;V ).
For technical reasons we have to assume that the triple of strategies (UP;UA;V ) satis¯es certain
restrictions. First, we assume that UA is twice continuously di®erentiable and that UP and V
are continuously di®erentiable. We also assume that UP and UA are such that the stochastic
di®erential equation that results from (1) by replacing the control variables uP(t) and uA(t) by















Condition (4) is hard to interpret as it jointly involves the equilibrium state trajectory x, the
2As will be explained in a moment, the agent's contractual duties consist merely of being `on the job' or `on
site', i.e., not taking his outside option. This follows from the fact that the agent's e®ort is not observable.
10principal's time-preference rate ½P, and the agent's marginal cost function C0
A and e®ort strategy
UA. Essentially, however, it is a boundedness assumption. For example, in the deterministic
case with ¾(x) = 0 for all x, a su±cient but by no means necessary condition for (4) to hold is
that x(t) remains bounded. This suggests that (4) will typically hold if the marginal bene¯ts
of the state F 0
P(x) and F 0
A(x) for large values of x are small compared to the marginal costs of
maintaining the state at x.3
3 The agent's optimization problem
Consider any given pair of the principal's strategies (UP;V ). In this section we describe the





¡½At [F(x(t)) ¡ CA(uA(t))] dt
subject to
dx = [f(x(t)) + uA(t)] dt + ¾(x(t))dw;x(0) = x0;
where F(x) = FA(x) + V (x) and f(x) = ®UP(x) ¡ ±x. This is a standard stochastic optimal
control problem amenable to solution by the dynamic programming approach. Denoting the




F(x) ¡ CA(uA) + W
0









Due to our assumptions on the cost function CA, the right-hand side of this equation has a
unique maximizer uA determined by the ¯rst-order condition C0
A(uA) = W 0
A(x). It follows that
3In section 4 below, the technical reasons for imposing equation (4) will become clear.






This equation has the simple economic interpretation that the marginal cost to the agent
of exerting e®ort is equal to the marginal contribution of this e®ort to his own stock value.






A(UA(z))dz + WA(x0): (7)
Finally, by substituting uA = UA(x), (6), and (7) back into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman






A(UA(z))dz + ½AWA(x0) (8)
= F(x) ¡ CA(UA(x)) + C
0






Now recall that the agent has an outside option that yields overall utility equal to 0. The
agent will therefore only accept the principal's contract if the condition WA(x0) ¸ 0 is satis¯ed.
Moreover, in equilibrium this participation constraint must be binding because, if it were not,
the principal could gain from replacing V by V", where V"(x) = V (x) ¡ " and where " is a
su±ciently small positive number. As a matter of fact, because V and V" di®er only by a
deterministic constant, both contracts (UP;V ) and (UP;V") provide the same incentives to the
agent, but the principal's expected utility under (UP;V") exceeds her expected utility under
(UP;V ) by ¯"=½P > 0. To summarize, in equilibrium it must hold that WA(x0) = 0 and it
follows therefore from (8) and the de¯nitions of F and f that














12Equation (9) is an implementability condition very much in the spirit of Chang (1988) and
Shimomura and Xie (2008). It is a condition that the principal's contract (UP;V ) must satisfy
in order for the strategy UA to be optimal for the agent. In the next section we shall use this
condition to formulate the principal's optimization problem.
In order to interpret condition (9) in economic terms, we use (6) and (7) to rewrite it as
V (x) = CA(UA(x)) ¡ FA(x) + ½AWA(x) ¡ W
0




This says that the transfer the agent receives (when the observed state is x) is su±cient to
compensate his e®ort cost, CA(UA(x)), net of the current bene¯ts that he derives from the
stock, FA(x), net of the `interest cost' as perceived by the agent, ¡½AWA(x), and net of the
`investment value'. The latter consists of a term corresponding to the deterministic component
in the state equation (1) as well as an adjustment for risk.
4 The principal's optimization problem
As has been explained in section 2, the principal takes the optimal response of the agent into
account when she chooses her optimal contract (UP;V ). The optimal response of the agent, in
turn, has implicitly been described by the implementability condition (9). Note in particular
that, for any given pair (UP;UA), condition (9) determines a unique transfer strategy V . It is
therefore possible to reformulate the principal's optimization problem as follows: the principal
seeks to ¯nd a pair of e®ort strategies (UP;UA) such that her objective functional in (2) is max-
imized subject to the constraints uP(t) = UP(x(t)), uA(t) = UA(x(t)), v(t) = V (x(t)), (1), and
(9). Unfortunately, this is not a standard optimal control problem because the implementability
condition contains both derivatives and integrals of the strategy UA. Consequently, standard
13optimization techniques like the maximum principle or the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
cannot be directly applied. In the rest of this section we will therefore rewrite the principal's
optimization problem in a more convenient form. In particular, we shall identify two important
special cases of the model in which the principal's optimization problem can indeed be written
as a standard optimal control problem. In one of these case, the two players have the same
time-preference rate, and in the other case there is no uncertainty.







FP(x(t)) + ¯FA(x(t)) + ¯C
0

























Note that the right-hand side of equation (10) consists of two terms. The rate of impatience of

























As a matter of fact, by Ito's lemma we have


































+ D(x0;0) = 0:








Using the last two identities, integrating equation (12) from t = 0 to +1, and forming expec-
tations E0 we get (11).
Finally, we substitute (11) into (10). After some rearrangement and using UP(x(t)) = uP(t)







FP(x(t)) + ¯FA(x(t)) ¡ CP(uP(t)) ¡ ¯CA(uA(t)) (13)
+[¯(½P ¡ ½A)=½P]C
0









Notice that the principal's objective function, after taking into account the implementability
constraint, consists of three terms: (i) the ¯rst term is the weighted sum of utilities of the
principal and the agent (with weights 1 and ¯, respectively), (ii) the second term is non-zero
only if the two rates of impatience, ½P and ½A, di®er from each other, and (iii) the third term
is non-zero only if in addition to ½P 6= ½A the function ¾ is not identically equal to 0 . The only
non-standard term in this objective functional is the third one as it contains the derivative of
the strategy UA. We summarize our ¯ndings in the following result.





¡½t fFP(x(t)) + ¯FA(x(t)) ¡ CP(uP(t)) ¡ ¯CA(uA(t))g dt
15subject to the state equation (1).






subject to the state equation
_ x(t) = ®uP(t) + uA(t) ¡ ±x(t);x(0) = x0;
where
G(x;uP;uA) (14)
= FP(x) + ¯FA(x) ¡ CP(uP) ¡ ¯CA(uA) + [¯(½P ¡ ½A)=½P]C
0
A(uA)[®uP + uA ¡ ±x]:
(c) In all other cases, the principal's optimization problem is to maximize JP given in (13)
subject to uA(t) = UA(x(t)) and the state equation (1).
Proof: The result follows immediately from (13). ¤
We shall illustrate the application of theorem 1 by means of two examples in sections 6 and 7
below. In this regard we note that the integrand in part (a) of the theorem is strictly concave
with respect to (uP;uA) due to our assumptions on the cost functions CP and CA. In the
case of part (b), the integrand is not necessarily strictly concave unless one imposes additional
assumptions on the cost functions. This will also be illustrated below.
The case of equal time-preference rates ½P = ½A (case (a) of the above theorem) has the
interesting feature that the principal's objective functional is simply a weighted average of the
two players' net utility functions, whereby `net' refers to the absence of the transfer. Thus, the
principal selects a Pareto e±cient pair of e®ort strategies (UP;UA) and designs the transfer V
16in such a way that the agent is induced to implement UA. Which Pareto-e±cient pair (UP;UA)
is chosen by the principal depends on the size of the distortion ¯. The more costly it is to the
principal to transfer one unit of utility to the agent, the more weight the principal gives to the
agent's preferences.
In the general case ½P 6= ½A the principal's objective functional is no longer a weighted average
of the two players' net utility functions, as can be seen, for example, from equation (14) in part
(b) of the theorem.
5 Markov-perfection and time-consistency
In the discussion so far we have assumed that both players are bound by the contract once they
have signed it: the principal must satisfy her contractual agreement (UP;V ) and the agent has
no access to his outside option. In other words, there is no possibility of renegotiation at any
point in time t > 0 or in any state x 6= x0. In this section we shall discuss if and when the
players have incentives to renegotiate the contract, and we shall analyze the implications of
allowing renegotiations to take place.
To discuss this point recall that the rationality of the principal together with the participation
constraint for the agent requires WA(x0) = 0. If for some t > 0 it holds that WA(x(t)) < 0, then
it follows that the agent can bene¯t from terminating the contract with the principal at time t
and switching to his outside option that gives him utility 0. If, on the other hand, WA(x(t)) > 0
is satis¯ed for some t, then the principal can bene¯t from terminating the contract and setting
up a new one that reduces the agent's continuation value to 0. In the examples presented
in sections 6 and 7 below, both of these situations will be seen to occur generically (which
17one occurs depends on the parameter values as well as on the realizations of the stochastic
disturbances). This shows that the equilibrium is generically not time-consistent.
The incentives for termination or renegotiation of the contract that have been discussed in
the previous paragraph are ruled out if it can be ensured that along the equilibrium path
WA(x(t)) = 0 holds for all t. In this situation we call the equilibrium time-consistent. An
even stronger requirement would be that WA(x) = 0 holds for all x 2 R. This requirement,
which ensures that neither party has an incentive to terminate the present arrangement in any
possible state of the system (even o® the equilibrium path), is called Markov-perfection. In
what follows we shall ¯rst discuss Markov-perfection for the general stochastic case and then
consider time-consistency for the special case of no uncertainty.
Theorem 2 In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, it holds that UA(x) = 0 and V (x) = ¡FA(x) for
all x 2 R. Furthermore, the strategy UP is determined as the optimal policy function of the





¡½Pt [FP(x(t)) + ¯FA(x(t)) ¡ CP(uP(t))] dt
subject to
dx(t) = [®uP(t) ¡ ±x(t)]dt + ¾(x(t))dw(t):
Proof: Because of our assumptions on the cost function CA, the condition WA(x) = 0 for all
x 2 R translates directly into UA(x) = 0 and V (x) = ¡FA(x); see equations (6) and (9). Using
these observations it is easily seen from (13) and (1) that the principal faces the stochastic
optimal control problem stated in the present theorem. This completes the proof. ¤
It can be seen from the above theorem that the requirement of Markov-perfection imposes
very strong restrictions on the principal. More speci¯cally, she has to neutralize the agent's
18preferences for the state, i.e., V (x) = ¡FA(x). This makes the agent completely indi®erent to
the value of the state and, consequently, the agent has no incentive whatsoever to spend any
e®ort, i.e., UA(x) = 0. This is the case even if, absent the transfer, the agent derives positive
utility from the state. Thus, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium only the principal controls the
state and in doing so she takes into account her own preferences and the necessary compensation
to the agent.
Let us now turn to the weaker requirement of time-consistency, i.e., to the condition WA(x(t)) =
0 for all t. In a non-degenerate stochastic setting, this condition is not much di®erent from
Markov-perfection because, due to the stochastic disturbances, the equilibrium state trajectory
will reach any point in the state space with positive probability. Therefore, in the rest of this
section we restrict attention to the deterministic model with ¾(x) = 0 for all x.
It is obvious that the time-consistency condition WA(x(t)) = 0 for all t holds if and only
if the utility °ow to the agent is constant and equal to 0 for all t, that is, if and only if
FA(x(t))¡CA(UA(x(t)))+V (x(t)) = 0 holds for all t. Substituting this into the implementability








A(UA(x(t)))[®UP(x(t)) + UA(x(t)) ¡ ±x(t)]:
Note that this equation can also be written as
C
0






Using the variable transformation z = x(s), which implies dz = _ x(s)ds, and de¯ning y(t) =
C0





19This shows that y(0) = 0 and _ y(t) = ½Ay(t) must hold. It follows that y(t) = 0 for all t
and, hence, for every t, it must either be the case that C0
A(UA(x(t))) = 0 or _ x(t) = 0. Since
C0
A(uA) = 0 holds if and only if uA = 0, the condition y(t) = 0 for all t is therefore equivalent
to
UA(x(t))_ x(t) = UA(x(t))[®UP(x(t)) + UA(x(t)) ¡ ±x(t)] = 0 (15)
for all t. What we have just shown is that in a time-consistent equilibrium of the deterministic
model the implementability condition (9) is given by (15). This allows us to formulate the
following result.
Theorem 3 Suppose that ¾(x) = 0 holds for all x 2 R. The principal's optimization problem





¡½Pt fFP(x(t)) + ¯FA(x(t)) ¡ CP(uP(t)) ¡ ¯CA(uA(t))g dt
subject to the the state equation
_ x(t) = ®uP(t) + uA(t) ¡ ±x(t); x(0) = x0
and the control constraint
uA(t)[®uP(t) + uA(t) ¡ ±x(t)] = 0: (16)
Proof: It has been shown above that FA(x(t))¡CA(UA(x(t)))+V (x(t)) = 0 must hold which
implies v(t) = V (x(t)) = ¡FA(x(t)) + CA(uA(t)). Substituting this into (2) we obtain the
objective functional stated in the theorem. The control constraint (16) is just a reiteration of
(15). ¤
Although the instantaneous utility of the principal in theorem 3 is a strictly concave function
of the controls and the state equation is linear in the controls, the principal's optimization
20problem is likely to have no optimal solution. This is the case because the set of admissible
controls de¯ned by (16) is not convex (more speci¯cally, it is the union of two straight lines in
the control space). Except perhaps for borderline cases we therefore cannot expect the game
under consideration to have a time-consistent feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. For this reason
we shall not discuss this case any further.
6 A linear example
In this section we assume that FP(x) = °Px, FA(x) = °Ax, and ± = 0. We shall discuss the
equilibrium under these assumptions following the case distinction from theorem 1, that is, we
will ¯rst assume that the players have equal time-preference rates, then we will look at the
deterministic case, and ¯nally we will also brie°y study the general case.
So, for the moment suppose that ½P = ½A = ½. According to theorem 1(a), the Hamiltonian-
Jacobi-Bellman equation of the principal's optimal control problem is
½WP(x) = max
©
°x ¡ CP(uP) ¡ ¯CA(uA) + W
0






where ° = °P + ¯°A and where the maximization is with respect to (uP;uA) 2 R2. It is
straightforward to verify that the linear function WP(x) = (°=½)x + B satis¯es this equation
and that the corresponding optimal policy functions are
UP(x) = ¹ uP := (C
0
P)




Here, the constant B is de¯ned by
B = (1=½)[(®°=½)¹ uP + (°=½)¹ uA ¡ CP(¹ uP) ¡ ¯CA(¹ uA)]:
21Substituting these results into the implementability condition (9) we obtain
V (x) = (°Px ¡ °x0)=¯ + CA(¹ uA) ¡ (°=¯)(®¹ uP + ¹ uA): (18)
We summarize these ¯ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that FP(x) = °Px, FA(x) = °Ax, ± = 0, and ½P = ½A = ½ hold. Then it
follows that the unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given by (17)-(18).
Note that, under the assumptions of this lemma, equations (7), (17), and W(x0) = 0 imply
that WA(x) = °(x ¡ x0)=(¯½). This shows that the sign of WA(x(t)) coincides with the sign of
°[x(t) ¡ x0] and it follows therefore that, due to the stochastic evolution of the state variable,
both cases WA(x(t)) > 0 and WA(x(t)) < 0 will typically occur. Recalling our discussion from
section 5 this implies that there will typically exist incentives to terminate the contract for both
players (although at di®erent times). Note, however, that the strategies and value functions in
the present case are independent of the form of the function ¾.
Now let us turn to the deterministic model in which ¾(x) = 0 holds for all x but in which the
time-preference rates of the two players may di®er from each other. According to theorem 1(b),
the Hamiltonian of the principal's optimization problem is given by
H(x;uP;uA) = °x + ©(uP;uA) + ¹(®uP + uA);
where ¹ denotes the adjoint variable and where
©(uP;uA) = [¯(½P ¡ ½A)=½P]C
0
A(uA)(®uP + uA) ¡ CP(uP) ¡ ¯CA(uA): (19)
From our assumptions imposed on the cost function CP it follows that © is strictly concave with
respect to uP. For the remainder of this section we assume in addition that © is strictly concave
22with respect to (uP;uA). Note that this assumption trivially implies that the Hamiltonian
function is jointly concave in (x;uP;uA).
The adjoint equation is
_ ¹(t) = ½P¹(t) ¡ °
and admits a constant solution ¹(t) = °=½P. We will see shortly that for this constant solution
the transversality condition is satis¯ed so that we do not need to consider other solutions of
the adjoint equation. From the strict concavity assumptions imposed above, it follows that the
¯rst-order conditions for the maximization of the Hamiltonian function with respect to (uP;uA)





P(uP) + ®° = 0; (20)
¯(½P ¡ ½A)[C
00




A(uA) + ° = 0; (21)
and that these conditions have a unique solution (~ uP; ~ uA). Substituting these results into (9)
we obtain a linear strategy for the transfers given by
V (x) = [C
0
A(~ uA)½A ¡ °A]x + CA(~ uA) ¡ C
0
A(~ uA)(®~ uP + ~ uA + ½Ax0): (22)
Because the optimal controls (~ uP; ~ uA) are constant, it is obvious that in this equilibrium the
state variable grows linearly and, hence, both the transversality condition of the principal's
optimization problem as well as condition (4) are satis¯ed. Thus, we get the following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose that FP(x) = °Px, FA(x) = °Ax, ¾(x) = 0, and ± = 0. Assume further-
more that the function © speci¯ed in (19) is strictly concave. Then it follows that the unique
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given by UP(x) = ~ up, UA(x) = ~ uA, and V , where
(~ uP; ~ uA) is the unique solution of equations (20)-(21), and where V is given by (22).
23Proof: It has been shown above that the stated strategies qualify as an equilibrium. To
show that it is unique, it su±ces to rule out that there are other solutions to the principal's
optimization problem. These would have to correspond to solutions of the adjoint equation
that are not constant. It can be shown that these solutions do not satisfy (4). ¤
Let us also check for the deterministic case which of the two players has an incentive to terminate
the contract. From lemma 2 we know that in equilibrium _ x(t) = ®~ uP + ~ uA and, hence, x(t) =
(®~ uP +~ uA)t+x0. From (7) and W(x0) = 0 it follows that WA(x) = C0
A(~ uA)(x¡x0). Combining
these observations yields WA(x(t)) = C0
A(~ uA)(®~ uP + ~ uA)t. Together with the fact that the
sign of C0(~ uA) coincides with the sign of ~ uA this implies that the sign of WA(x(t)) coincides
with the sign of ~ uA(®~ uP + ~ uA). In general, there are parameter constellations that lead to
~ uA(®~ uP + ~ uA) < 0 in which case the agent has an incentive to terminate the contract. If,
however, the parameter constellation is such that both agents use positive e®ort, ~ uP > 0 and
~ uA > 0, then it follows that only the principal can bene¯t from renegotiations.
We conclude this section by brie°y commenting on the general (non-deterministic) case with
½P 6= ½A. Theorem 1 does not give us a standard form of the principal's optimization problem.
Instead of trying to develop necessary optimality conditions for this non-standard optimization
problem, let us just look for an optimum in a restricted class of strategies.4 The results presented
in lemmas 1 and 2 show that, for the two special cases covered by these lemmas, the optimal
e®ort strategy of the agent, UA, is a constant function. Let us therefore seek an equilibrium of
the stochastic model under the additional restriction that UA is constant. In this case it holds
for all x 2 R that U0






4See our introductory section 1 for a discussion of this approach and some references.
24subject to the state equation (1), where the function G is de¯ned in (14). Based on the previous
results of this section, we conjecture that the optimal value function WP is linear. In that case,
W 00
P(x) = 0 so that the corresponding term in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation vanishes.
It follows that the optimal values for uP and uA as well as the optimal value function WP
coincide with those found in the deterministic case. We can therefore conclude that in the
stochastic model with the additional restriction of UA being a constant function, the results
from lemma 2 remain true. We conjecture that lemma 2 remains true also in the general
stochastic model (i.e., without the restriction of a constant strategy UA) but we have no proof
for that conjecture.
7 A linear-quadratic example
In this section we consider the case in which the functions FP, FA, CP, and CA are quadratic
polynomials and ¾ is a linear polynomial. In this case and under the assumptions of theorem 1(a-
b), the principal's optimization problem turns out to be a linear-quadratic optimal control
problem for which solution methods and characterization results are readily available. Instead of
treating the general case here, we focus on a very speci¯c example. This example is characterized
by FP(x) = ¡(°=2)x2, FA(x) = 0, CP(u) = CA(u) = (1=2)u2, ¾(x) = ¹ ¾x, and ® = 0, where °
is strictly positive and ¹ ¾ is non-negative. Note that our maintained assumptions on the cost
functions CP and CA are satis¯ed by these speci¯cations. The assumption ® = 0 means that
the principal is unable to a®ect the state of the system herself. She will therefore optimally
choose uP(t) = 0 for all t. The assumption FA(x) = 0, on the other hand, implies that the agent
does not care about the state of the system. To summarize, the only way how the principal
can a®ect the state is by inducing the agent via an appropriate transfer mechanism V to spend
25e®ort. And the only reason why the agent applies some e®ort uA(t) is because he is induced
to do so by the principal's transfers. As in the previous section we proceed along the lines
suggested by the case distinction in theorem 1.
If both players have the same time-preference rate ½P = ½A = ½, then we obtain from theorem 1
















Maximizing with respect to uP and uA yields uP = 0 (thereby con¯rming our earlier claim that
UP(x) = 0 holds for all x) and uA = (1=¯)W 0
P(x). Substituting these ¯ndings back into the











Because of the linear-quadratic structure of the model we conjecture a quadratic optimal value
function of the form WP(x) = (K=2)x2. Substituting this conjecture into the above equation,
we see that the conjecture is true provided that K satis¯es the quadratic equation
K
2 ¡ ¯(½ ¡ ¹ ¾
2 + 2±)K ¡ ¯° = 0: (23)
This equation has two real roots, one negative and one positive. Only the negative root can lead
to the correct optimal value function as the latter must be concave. Hence, we conclude that
K = ¹ K, where ¹ K is the unique negative solution of (23). This implies that UA(x) = ( ¹ K=¯)x.
Substituting this into (9) leads after simpli¯cations (using (23)) to V (x) = ¡(°x2+½ ¹ Kx2
0)=(2¯).
We summarize our ¯ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that FP(x) = ¡°x2=2, FA(x) = 0, ¾(x) = ¹ ¾x, ® = 0, ° > 0, and ½P =
½A = ½. Then it follows that the unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given
26by UP(x) = 0, UA(x) = ( ¹ K=¯)x, and V (x) = ¡(°x2 + ½ ¹ Kx2
0)=(2¯), where ¹ K is the unique
negative solution of (23).
Using this lemma, (7), and W(x0) = 0 it is easy to calculate the optimal value function of the
agent. It is given by WA(x) = [ ¹ K=(2¯)](x2 ¡ x2
0). If x0 = 0, then this shows that WA(x) · 0
holds for all x 2 R. In this situation the principal can therefore never have an incentive to
terminate the contract, whereas the agent does want to renegotiate. However, if x0 6= 0, both
parties can have incentives for renegotiation depending on the realization of the stochastic noise
process.
It is easy to analyze how the model parameters in°uence the equilibrium strategies. As an
example consider the parameter ¹ ¾. It can be seen from (23) that ¹ K is strictly decreasing in ¹ ¾.
This implies that the absolute value of the slope of UA is strictly increasing with respect to ¹ ¾,
which means that the agent reacts stronger to changes in x in a model with high uncertainty
than in a model with low noise. Analogously, one ¯nds that, for any given x, the transfer V (x)
is non-decreasing with respect to ¹ ¾.
Let us now consider the deterministic version of this example. Using theorem 1(b) we see that


















P + ¹(uA ¡ ±x);
where ¹ denotes again the adjoint variable. This function is strictly concave with respect to
(uP;uA) if and only if ½P < 2½A, a condition that we assume to hold for the rest of this section.
Maximization of the Hamiltonian with respect to uP yields uP = 0. We shall therefore omit
the control variable uP(t) from the following discussion and consider uA(t) as the only relevant







uA(t) + ¹(t) = 0;




Together with (1) these two equations form a set of linear equations that can be reduced to the





















































The determinant of the system matrix of (24) is equal to
D = ¡
[° + ¯±(± + ½A)]½P
¯(2½A ¡ ½P)
< 0:
It follows that the matrix has one positive and one negative eigenvalue. Since the positive
eigenvalue must be larger than ½P (which is the trace of the system matrix), the corresponding
solution does not satisfy condition (4). Hence, only the stable solution is relevant. We therefore
obtain the following result.
Lemma 4 Suppose that FP(x) = ¡°x2=2, FA(x) = 0, ¾(x) = 0, ® = 0, ° > 0, and ½P <
2½A. Then it follows that the unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given by
UP(x) = 0, UA(x) = (± +z)x, and V (x) = vx2=2+v0, where z is the negative eigenvalue of the
system matrix in (24) and where v = (½A + ± ¡ z)(± + z) and v0 = ¡½A(± + z)x2
0=2.
Proof: It has been shown above that UP(x) = 0. An eigenvector of the system matrix in (24)
that corresponds to the negative eigenvalue z is given by (1;±+z)T. This shows that the stable
solution of (24) is characterized by uA(t) = (± + z)x(t) = UA(x(t)). Finally, the form of V can
28be derived by substituting the results already derived into the implementability constraint (9).
This proves the necessity of the conditions stated in the lemma. For su±ciency just note that
the principal's optimal control problem has a strictly concave Hamiltonian function and that,
because of the stability of the solution of (24), the transversality condition is satis¯ed. This
completes the proof of the lemma. ¤
From lemma 4 we know that _ x(t) = zx(t) and, hence, x(t) = x0ezt. Moreover, together with
(7) and W(x0) = 0 the lemma implies that WA(x) = [(± + z)=2](x2 ¡ x2
0). Taking these results
together, we obtain WA(x(t)) = [(± + z)x2
0=2](e2zt ¡ 1). Since z < 0 by construction, we see
that the sign of WA(x(t)) coincides with the sign of ¡(±+z). If z < ¡±, then this expression is
positive and it is the principal who can bene¯t from a termination of the contract. To ¯nd out
under which parameter constellations it holds that z < ¡±, one can evaluate the characteristic
polynomial of the system matrix in (24) at ¡± and check whether this value is negative. It is
straightforward to see that this is the case if and only if
° > ¯±(2± + ½P)(½A ¡ ½P)=½P:
Note that this condition is automatically satis¯ed if ½P ¸ ½A. In the converse case ½P < ½A,
on the other hand, the condition is only satis¯ed if ° is su±ciently large. In other words, the
agent has an incentive to terminate the contract if he is less patient than the principal and if
the principal's cost of a non-zero stock is small.
An interesting feature of this example is that, when the agent is more impatient than the
principal (i.e. ½P < ½A), it may be the case that ± +z > 0, which implies that UA(x) is strictly
positive when x > 0. This means that the principal induces the agent to add to the stock
when the stock is already positive even though the principal ideally would want a zero stock.
At ¯rst sight, this result may seem counter-intuitive: why would the principal ask the agent
29to contribute to the growth of something that she does not want? Note, however, that it is
still true that _ x(t) < 0 when x(t) > 0, but that the agent is asked to make the convergence to
zero slower. Upon re°ection, this case arises only because the agent discounts the future more
heavily than the principal. Starting with some x0 > 0, the agent receives positive transfers
early in the program and receives negative transfers as x(t) gets close to zero. So what happens
is that the principal sends utility to the agent early in the game and reduces the agent's utility
later in the game. In other words, the principal is bene¯ting from intertemporal lending and
borrowing. The more patient person (the principal) lends to the less patient one (the agent).
In the rest of this section we consider the general case covered by theorem 1(c). As in the
previous section, however, we restrict the set of functions from which the agent's strategy UA
can be chosen. Due to the linear-quadratic structure of the game we assume that feasible
strategies UA must be linear, i.e., of the form UA(x) = Ãx where Ã is a deterministic coe±cient.











dx(t) = (Ã ¡ ±)x(t)dt + ¹ ¾x(t)dw(t); x(0) = x0;
where
L(Ã) = ¯(2½A ¡ ½P)Ã
2=½P + ¯(½P ¡ ½A)(2± ¡ ¹ ¾
2)Ã=½P + °:
Note that L(Ã) > 0 holds for all Ã 2 R provided that




For the rest of this section we assume this condition to hold. Obviously, it is still optimal for
the principal to choose uP(t) = 0 for all t. Furthermore, the state equation displayed above
30implies that x is a geometric Brownian motion given by
x(t) = x0 exp
£
(Ã ¡ ± ¡ ¹ ¾
2=2)t + ¹ ¾w(t)
¤
:
Substituting these results back into the objective functional we obtain
JP =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
¡L(Ã)x2
0=[2(½P + 2± ¡ ¹ ¾2 ¡ 2Ã)] if Ã < (½P + 2± ¡ ¹ ¾2)=2;
¡1 otherwise.
The optimal value for Ã can therefore be found by maximizing ¡L(Ã)=(½P + 2± ¡ ¹ ¾2 ¡ 2Ã)









4° + ¯(2± + 2½A ¡ ½P ¡ ¹ ¾2)(2± + ½P ¡ ¹ ¾2)
¯(2½A ¡ ½P)
#
Having found the optimal e®ort strategy UA(x) = Ãx, we obtain the optimal transfer from (9),
namely






We have shown how the leader's optimization problem in a certain class of Stackelberg di®er-
ential games with feedback strategies can be rewritten as a standard optimal control problem.
This is a noticeable property because, in general, the structure of this problem is so complex
that standard solution techniques are not applicable. Our approach is feasible because the class
of models under consideration in this paper has two crucial features: (i) the leader (principal)
can directly transfer utility to the follower (agent) and (ii) the follower has an outside option.
Feature (i) makes the implementability constraint for the leader very simple and feature (ii)
allows us to pin down the optimal value for the follower.
31There are a number of interesting directions for future research. First of all, in the present paper
we have restricted ourselves to the demonstration of the approach along with an illustration by
two simple examples. What is still missing is to apply this approach to an interesting real-life
problem and to derive economic insights from such an application. In this respect it may be
worthwhile to extend the applicability of the approach to slightly modi¯ed versions of the model
considered here. For example, one could try to get rid of some of the additive separability that
we have assumed for the utility functions of the two players (e.g., the additive separability
between the bene¯ts of the stock and the costs of e®ort). In a similar vein, we believe that
the linearity of the state equation is an assumption that may be relaxed. Finally, one could
imagine that the approach can be generalized to situations in which there are either multiple
agents or multiple principals. The latter situation is know as the common agency problem, a
static version of which has been studied for example by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
As for the two crucial model features pointed out above, we suppose that it will be much harder
to relax them. In a di®erential game in which the follower does not have an outside option,
the follower's optimal value is not determined by the outside option and, hence, it remains an
endogenous variable in the leader's optimization problem. This seems to be a severe obstacle
to the application of standard optimal control techniques to the leader's problem. Similarly,
if we allow for other incentive mechanisms than a direct transfer of utility, it is much harder
to integrate the ¯rst-order conditions for the follower's problem in order to obtain a tractable
implementability constraint for the leader. Despite these di±culties we plan to look into these
issues in future research.
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